

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	Chm, SECOM		X		
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

FBI Review Completed

Executive Secretary

29 Nov 84

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SECRET

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535

November 29, 1984

LOGGED

30 NOV 1984

Executive Registry

84-9822

Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

Enclosed as you requested is suggested draft language for inclusion in a list of proposals for controlling leaks as developed at the SIG-I November 20, 1984, meeting. The consensus was clear from the meeting that under the category of Presidential initiatives, a speech without action would produce very little except concerns and criticism from the press that a commission would take too long; that a meeting with the media would likely be unproductive and misconstrued; and that the most significant Presidential initiative would be for the President to call in his own people and place specific responsibility on them to take internal steps to deal with the problem. In that vein, you asked me to prepare some suggested language, which you will find enclosed.

Under the category of investigations, you included the use of polygraphs. If that area is developed, I adopt Mary Lawton's suggestion that rather than use the term "suspects" we refer to "persons who are or who have become a logical focus" for investigation.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

William H. Webster
Director

Enclosure

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1-2.4.2



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The President has promulgated NSDD-19 and NSDD-84 and has personally conveyed his concerns to his Cabinet officers and agency heads. To date this has not produced any serious internal effort to control the unauthorized dissemination of classified information.

To produce this needed specific effort, it is recommended that the President personally place responsibility on his departmental heads and key White House officials and direct each of them to report to him in writing within a stated time period on what specific measures have been implemented within the respective departments to control the unauthorized outflow of classified information.

The personal responsibility of the department heads should be underscored. It should be made clear that no one in the Administration has authority to disclose classified information unless that person also has the authority to declassify such information and makes an appropriate record of his action. When violations occur, department heads must insist upon immediate and full cooperation with the Department of Justice.

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